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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

S/S

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January 6, 1977

TO : The Secretary

FROM : S/P - Winston Lord *W*

Your Lunch to Introduce Ambassador Huang  
to Secretary-designate Vance

In addition to Ambassador Huang Chen, the Chinese will be represented by the two other officers at your last meeting (Counselor Tsien Ta Yung and the interpreter). I have asked EA to do another roundup of Chinese domestic developments and attitudes on foreign policy similar to the one done for your December 21 meeting. Attached is a transcript of that session, which you may wish to show to Mr. Vance. Highlights of that very cordial meeting included:

- The Ambassador's rather defensive assertion that the situation in China is excellent and that the Central Committee headed by Chairman Hua Kuo-feng (note the emphasis on the collective rather than Hua alone) "has followed Chairman Mao's behest and smashed at one blow the 'Gang of Four' and the anti-party clique." This of course suggests that the situation is not excellent at all -- all the turmoil in China in recent weeks attest to this.
- The Ambassador's assurance that now Peking should be able to implement better Chairman Mao's revolutionary line in foreign policy (i.e., hostility to Moscow and opening to the West). This is a clear indication that the radicals would in fact oppose some of Mao's foreign policy.
- The Ambassador constantly invoked Chairman Mao's authority, including the many detailed conversations with you. He even went

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back to the Chairman as a means of ducking your direct question about what he saw as the biggest problem in future Sino-US relations. "The revolutionary line and policy formulated by Chairman Mao will never change."

- Consistent with the usual line, the Ambassador stressed our common opposition to the Polar Bear as the main element of our relations. He also stressed normalization and the fulfillment of our commitments in this regard, though he used the lighter touch of recent weeks rather than the heavier pressures we experienced over the summer.
- The Ambassador also, in typical Chinese seemingly casual fashion, elucidated your opinions of President-elect Carter and Secretary-designate Vance. Without boxing in the next Administration, you gave general reassurances about the continuity of our foreign policy with respect to Peking and Moscow.
- Similarly, the Ambassador got across his concern about any possible publication of conversations between us in his prolonged inquiries about your memoirs and documents. (Per your request I called the Chinese Liaison Office on the evening of December 30 to knock down as totally fabricated the New York Times article suggesting you would publish your conversations with Chairman Mao.)
- The Ambassador, unsurprisingly, made clear that no Chinese leader would visit Washington so long as we had not shifted our diplomatic relations. He generally dismissed the possibility of another American city without flatly ruling it out. Nor did the possibility

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of a third country come up (for instance, e.g. Japan) though I doubt seriously that anybody above the Foreign Minister would meet with us outside China. (You promised to inform Mr. Vance of the Chinese position.)

I see the purpose of this lunch as basically to introduce Mr. Vance and the Ambassador, to give Mr. Vance an opportunity to get across some general reassurance on behalf of President-elect Carter, and to symbolize continuity of American foreign policy. In this latter regard I think it is essential that there be a photo opportunity and some press play about the lunch similar to your meeting with Mr. Vance and Ambassador Dobrynin. There is an urgent need for the Carter Administration to make a positive statement about US/China relations against the background of all the attention being paid to US/Soviet relations, a possible Brezhnev visit here, uncertainty about the defense budget and our general posture in the world, and various statements by President-elect Carter and Mr. Vance in recent months to the effect that the security and independence of Taiwan is important and normalization with Peking will go slowly.

In addition to sizing up Mr. Vance and the foreign policy posture of the Carter Administration generally, I believe the Chinese would be most interested in what the Secretary-designate would have to say on the following issues: their attitude toward and relations with Moscow; their commitment and sense of timing on normalization; policies toward NATO, Japan and Western defenses generally; and the regional conflicts in the Middle East, Africa and Korea. The Ambassador presumably would also be interested in any prospects for early high level contacts between the Carter Administration and the Peking leadership. Finally, the Ambassador might want to know whether Secretary Vance will keep them informed of our international actions, particularly with regard to the Soviet Union, as you have done over the years.

Attachment

MemCon of Dec. 21, 1976 meeting

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